Like the terms “true” and “good,” the term “beautiful” (καλόν; _pulchrum_, _beau_, _schön_, etc.) is familiar to all. To reach a definition of it let us question experience. What do men commonly mean when, face to face with some object or event, they say “That is _beautiful_”? They give expression to this sentiment in the presence of a natural object such as a landscape revealing mountain and valley, lake and river and plain and woodland, glowing in the golden glow of the setting sun; or in contemplating some work of art—painting, sculpture, architecture, music: the _Sistine Madonna_, the _Moses_ of Michael Angelo, the Cathedral of _Notre Dame_, a symphony of Beethoven; or some literary masterpiece: Shakespeare’s _Macbeth_, or Dante’s _Divina Commedia_, or Newman’s _Apologia_, or Kickham’s _Knocknagow_. There are other things the sight of which arouses no such sentiment, but leaves us indifferent; and others again, the sight of which arouses a contrary sentiment, to which we give expression by designating them as “commonplace,” “vulgar,” “ugly”. The sentiment in question is one of _pleasure_ and _approval_, or of _displeasure_ and _disapproval_. Hence the first fact to note is that _the beautiful pleases us_, _affects us agreeably_, while the commonplace or the ugly leaves us indifferent or _displeases us_, _affects us disagreeably_. But the _good_ pleases us and affects us agreeably. Is the beautiful, then, identical with the good? No; the really beautiful is indeed always good; but not everything that is good is beautiful; nor is the pleasure aroused by the good identical with that aroused by the beautiful. Whatever gratifies the lower sense appetites and causes organic pleasure is good—_bonum delectabile_—but is not deemed beautiful. Eating and drinking, resting and sleeping, indulging the senses of touch, taste and smell, are indeed pleasure-giving, but they have no association with the beautiful. Again, the deformed child may be the object of the mother’s special love. But the pleasure thus derived from the good, as the object of appetite, desire, delight, is not esthetic pleasure. If we examine the latter, the pleasure caused by the beautiful, we shall find that it is invariably a pleasure peculiar to _knowledge_, to apprehension, perception, imagination, contemplation. Hence in the domain of the senses we designate as “beautiful” only what can be apprehended by the two higher senses, seeing and hearing, which approximate most closely to intellect, and which, through the imagination, furnish data for _contemplation_ to the intellect.(195) This brings us to St. Thomas’s definition: _Pulchra sunt quæ visa placent_: those things are beautiful whose vision pleases us,—where vision is to be understood in the wide sense of apprehension, contemplation.(196) The owner of a beautiful demesne, or of an art treasure, may derive pleasure from his sense of proprietorship; but this