primal matter and substantial form—since they are themselves not properly “beings,” but only “principles of being,” are said to belong each to its proper category, not formally but only referentially, not _formaliter_ but only _reductivé_. Finally, the various properties that are assigned to certain accidents themselves are either logical relations (such as “not having a contrary” or “being a measure”), or real relations, or intrinsic modes of the accident itself (as when a quality is said to have a certain “intensity”); but in all cases where they are not mere logical entities they will be found to come under one or other of the Aristotelian categories. The “real being” which is thus “determined” into the supreme modes or categories of substance and accidents is, of course, “being” considered _substantially_ as _essential_ (whether possible or actual), and not merely being that is actually existent, _existential_ being, in the _participial_ sense. Furthermore, it is primarily finite or created being that is so determined. The Infinite Being is above the categories, _super_-substantial. It is because substance is the most perfect of the categories, and because the Infinite Being verifies in Himself in an incomprehensibly perfect manner all the perfections of substance, that we speak of Him as a substance: remembering always that these essentially finite human concepts are to be predicated of Him only _analogically_ (2, 5). It may be inquired whether “accident” is a genus which should be predicated _univocally_ of the nine Aristotelian categories as species? or is the concept of “accident” only _analogical_, so that these nine categories would be each a _summum genus_ in the strict sense, _i.e._ an ultimate and immediate determination of the concept of “being” itself? We have seen already that the concept of “being” as applied to “substance” and “accident” is analogical (2). So, too, it is analogical as applied to the various categories of accidents. For the characteristic note of “accident,” that of “affecting, inhering in” a subject, can scarcely be said to be verified “in the same way,” “univocally,” of the various kinds of accidents; it is therefore more probably correct not to regard “accident” as a genus proper, but to conceive each kind of accident as a _summum genus_ coming immediately under the transcendental concept of “being”.