(_a_) The specific and generic natures of substantial entities do not inhere, like accidents, in individual substances; they constitute the essence of the latter, and hence these _universals_ are called substances. But the universal as such does not really exist; it is realized only in individuals; in the logical order it pre-supposes the individual as a logical subject of which it is affirmed, a _subjectum attributionis seu praedicationis_. Hence it is called a _second_ substance, while the individual substance is called a _first_ substance. Of course we can predicate attributes of universal substances, and use these as logical subjects, as when we say “_Man_ is mortal”. But such propositions have no real meaning, and give us no information about reality, except in so far as we can refer their predicates (“mortal”), through the medium of their universal subjects (“man”), back ultimately to the individual substances (John, James, etc.) which alone are real, and in which alone the universal (“man”) has its reality. Hence the individual is, in the logical order, the ultimate and fundamental subject of all our predications. And furthermore, the individual substance cannot be used as a logical predicate of anything underlying itself, while the universal substance can be so used in relation to the individual. In the ontological order, of course, the universal substance is individualized, and, as individual, it is the subject in which all accidents inhere, their _subjectum inhaesionis_: the _only_ subject of many of them, and the _remote_ or _ultimate_ subject of those of them which inhere _immediately_ in other accidents. Thus while in the ontological order all substances, whether we think of them as universal or as individual, are the ultimate subjects of inhesion for all real accidents, in the logical order it is only the individual substance that is the ultimate subject of attribution for all logical predicates. Hence it was that the individual substance (τόδε τί ὄν), vindicating for itself more fully the rôle of subject, was called by Aristotle οὐσία πρώτη, _substantia prima_, while he called the universal, specific or generic substance, οὐσία δεύτερα, _substantia secunda_.(278) These are, of course, two ways of regarding substance, and not two really distinct species of substance as genus. The distinction between the _membra dividentia_ is logical, not real.