Rigorously, however, this would only prove that subsistence is a perfection _naturally inseparable_ from the complete individual nature; _conceivably_ it _might_ still be _really_ distinct from the latter. But whether or not such real distinction could be suspected by the unaided light of reason working on natural experience, at all events what we know from Divine Revelation concerning the hypostatic union of the human nature of our Lord Jesus Christ with the Person of the Divine Word, enables us to realize that there _can_ be, in the actual order of things, a complete individual nature which is not a “subsisting being” or “person”; for the human nature of our Lord is _de facto_ such a nature,—and _ab actu ad posse valet consecutio_. This information, however, is not decisive in determining the character of the distinction between the individual substance or nature and its subsistence. It may be that the complete individual nature is _eo ipso_ and identically a “subsisting being” or “person,” that it is always independent, autonomous, _sui juris_, by the very fact that it is a complete individual nature, _unless it is_ DE FACTO _assumed into the personality of a higher nature_, so that in this intercommunication with the latter, in the unity of the latter’s personality, it is not independent, autonomous, _sui juris_, but dependent, subordinate, and _alterius juris_. In this condition, it loses nothing positive by the fact that it is not now a person and has not its own subsistence; nor does it gain any _natural_ perfection, for it was _ex hypothesi_ complete and perfect _as a nature_; but it gains something _supernatural_ inasmuch as it now subsists in a manner wholly undue to it.(293) According to this view, therefore, subsistence would not be a perfection really distinct from the complete individual nature; it would be a mentally distinct aspect of the latter, a positive aspect, however, consisting in this nature’s completeness, its self-sufficing, autonomous character, and consequent incommunicability.(294)