Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
Scholastic Philosophy has generally adopted Aristotle’s division of
qualities into four great groups:(327) (1) ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις, _habitus vel
dispositio_; (2) δύναμις φυσικὴ ἢ ἀδυναμία, potentia _naturalis vel
impotentia_; (3) ποιότητες παθητικαί καὶ πάθη, _potentiae passivae et
passiones_; (4) μορφὴ ἢ σχῆμα, _forma vel figura_. St. Thomas offers the
following ground for this classification. Since quality, he says,(328) is
an accidental determination of the substance itself, _i.e._ of the
perfection of its concrete existence and activity, and since we may
distinguish four aspects of the substance: its nature itself as
perfectible; its intrinsic principles of acting and receiving action,
principles springing from the _formative_, specific constituent of its
nature; its receptivity of change effected by such action, a receptivity
grounded in the determinable or _material_ principle of its nature; and
finally its quantity, if it be a corporeal substance,—we can likewise
distinguish between (1) _acquired habits or dispositions_, such as health,
knowledge, virtue, vice, etc., which immediately determine the perfection
of the substance, disposing it well or ill in relation to its last end;
(2) intrinsic _natural forces_, _faculties_, _powers of action_,
_aptitudes_, _capacities_, such as intellect, will, imagination, instinct,
organic vital forces, physical, chemical, mechanical energies; (3) states
resulting in a corporeal being from the action of its _milieu_ upon it:
the _passions_ and emotions of sentient living things, such as sensations
of pleasure, pain, anger, etc.; the _sensible qualities_ of matter, such
as colour, taste, smell, temperature, feel or texture, etc.; and, finally
(4) the quality of _form or shape_ which is a mere determination of the
quantity of a corporeal substance.
This classification is not indeed perfect, for the same individual quality
can be placed in different classes when looked at from different
standpoints: heat, for instance, may be regarded as a _natural operative
power_ of a substance in a state of combustion, or as a _sensible quality_
produced in that substance by the operation of other agencies. But it has
the merit of being an exhaustive classification; and philosophers have not
succeeded in improving on it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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