Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
The priority of the actual as compared with the potential in the
real order, suggests a proof of the existence of God in the manner
indicated above. It also affords a refutation of Hegelian monism.
The conception of the world, including all the phenomena of mind
and matter, as the gradual self-manifestation or evolution of a
potential being eternally actualizing itself, is a
self-contradictory conception. Scholastics rightly maintain that
the realities from which we derive our first most abstract and
transcendental notion of being in general, are actual realities.
Hegelians seize on the object of this notion, identify it with
pure thought, proclaim it the sole reality, and endow it with the
power of becoming actually everything. It is manifest, therefore,
that they endow purely potential being with the power of
actualizing itself.
Nor can they fairly avoid this charge by pointing out that
although their starting-point is not actual being (with which the
scholastic philosophy of being commences), yet neither is it
possible or potential being, but being which has neither of these
determinations, being which abstracts from both, like the real
being of the scholastics (7, 13). For though real being can be _an
object of abstract human thought_ without either of the predicates
“existent” or “non-existent,” yet it cannot be anything _in the
real order_ without either of them. There it must be either
actually existent or else merely potential. But Hegelians claim
absolutely indeterminate being to be _as such_ something in the
real order; and though they try to distinguish it from potential
being they nevertheless think of it as potential being, for they
distinctly and repeatedly declare that it can become all things,
and does become all things, and is constantly, eternally
transforming itself by an internal dialectic process into the
phenomena which constitute the worlds of mind and matter.
Contrasting it with the abstract “inert” being which they conceive
to be the object of the traditional metaphysics, they endow
“indeterminate being” with the active power of producing, and the
passive potentiality of becoming, actually everything. Thus, in
order to show _a priori_ how this indeterminate being must evolve
itself by internal logical necessity into the world of our direct
and immediate experience, they suppose it to be subject to change
and to be at the same time self-actualizing, in direct opposition
to the axiom that potential reality, reality which is subject to
change, cannot actualize itself: _Quidquid movetur ab alio
moveatur oportet_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account