Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
Those, then, are the principal kinds of change, as analysed by Aristotle
and the scholastics. We may note, finally, that the distinction between
_immanent_ and _transitive_ activity is also applied to change—that is, to
change considered as a process, not to the result of the change, to change
_in fieri_, not _in facto esse_. Immanent movement or activity (_motio_,
_actio immanens_) is that of which the term, the educed actuality, remains
within the agent—which latter is therefore at once both _agens_ and
_patiens_. Vital action is of this kind. Transitive movement or activity,
on the other hand (_motio_, _actio transiens_), is that of which the term
is some actuality educed in a being other than the agent. The _patiens_ is
here really distinct from the _agens_; and it is in the former, not in the
latter, that the change takes place: _actio fit in passo_. All change in
the inorganic universe is of this sort (101).
CHAPTER III. EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE.
12. EXISTENCE.—In the preceding chapters we examined reality in itself and
in its relation to change or becoming. We have now to examine it in
relation to its actual existence and to its intrinsic possibility (7,
_a_).
_Existing_ or _being_ (in the participial sense: esse, _existere_, τὸ
εἶναι) is a simple, indefinable notion. A being is said to exist when it
is not merely possible but actual, when it is not merely potential in its
active and passive causes but has become actual through those causes
(_existere_: _ex-sisto_: _ex-stare_: to stand forth, distinct from its
causes); or, if it have no causes, when it simply is (_esse_),—in which
sense God, the Necessary, purely Actual Being, simply _is_. Thus,
existence implies the notion of actuality, and is conceived as that by
which any thing or essence _is, distinct from nothingness, in the actual
order_.(83) Or, again, it is _the actuality of any thing or essence_.
About any conceivable being we may ask two distinct questions: (_a_) What
is it? and (_b_) Does such a being actually exist? The answer to the
former gives us the _essence_, what is presented to the mind through the
concept; the answer to the latter informs us about the actual _existence_
of the being or essence in question.
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