Ontology, or the Theory of BeingCoffey, P. (Peter)
Philosophy
Ontology, or the Theory of Being
Coffey, P. (Peter)
Ontology
through sense experience. What may be inferred from the fact that the
human intellect has this power of abstract thought, is another
question(92). But granting that it does apprehend essences in this manner,
we seem to have in this fact a sufficient explanation of the features just
referred to.
We have, however, already suggested other questions about the reality of
those possible essences. Is their possibility, so far as known to us,
explained by our experience of actual things? Or must we think them as
eternally, necessarily and immutably possible? From the manner in which we
must apprehend them, can we infer anything about the reality of an
Eternal, Immutable, Necessary Intelligence, in whose Thought and Essence
alone those essences, as apprehended by our minds, can find their ultimate
ground and explanation? These are the questions we must now endeavour to
examine.
16. POSSIBLE ESSENCES AS SUCH ARE SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM MERE LOGICAL
BEING, AND FROM NOTHINGNESS.—There have been philosophers who have held
that the actual alone is real, and only while it is actual; that a purely
(intrinsically) possible essence as such is nothing real; that the actual
alone is possible; that the purely possible as such is impossible. This
view is based on the erroneous assumption that whatever is or becomes
actual is so, or becomes so, by some sort of unintelligible fatalistic
necessity. Apart from the fact that it is incompatible with certain truths
of theism, such as the Divine Omnipotence and Freedom in creating, it also
involves the denial of all real becoming or change, and the assertion that
all actuality is eternal; for if anything becomes actual, it was
previously either possible or impossible; if impossible, it could never
become actual; if possible, then as possible it was something different
from the impossible, or from absolute nothingness. Moreover, the
intrinsically possible is capable of becoming actual, and may be
actualized if there exists some actual being with power to actualize it;
but absolute nothingness—or, in other words, the intrinsically
impossible—cannot be actualized, even by Omnipotence; therefore the
possible essence as such is something positive or real, as distinct from
nothingness. Finally, intrinsically possible essences can be clearly
distinguished from one another by the mind; but their negation which is
pure non-entity or nothingness cannot be so distinguished. It is therefore
clear that possible essences are in some true sense something positive or
real. From which it follows that nothingness, in the strict sense, is not
the mere absence or negation of actuality, but also the absence or
negation of that positive or real something which is intrinsic
possibility; in other words that nothingness in the strict sense means
intrinsic impossibility.
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