Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reckoning were at fault, except for their immediate purpose of soothing, or deluding the particular audiences to which they were addressed. The words were meaningless and absurd in a military sense; though conceivably they possessed some occult political virtue, and might help, for a time at least, to avert the retribution which is due to unfaithful stewards. Both these distinguished statesmen, as well as {263} many of their colleagues and followers, were beset by the error of false opposites. A soldier who has enlisted voluntarily, and another who is a conscript or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their country's enemies when they are ordered to do so. In both cases the particular war may be against their consciences and judgments; and their participation in it may therefore be involuntary. Of two men--equal in age, strength, training, and courage--one of whom believes his cause to be just, while the other does not, there can be no doubt that the former will fight better than the latter--even though the latter was enlisted under the voluntary system while the former was a conscript or 'pressed' man. In this sense the superiority of the 'voluntary' principle is incontestable. But is there any evidence to show, that either the original soldiers, or the new levies, of the German army are risking their lives in this war any less willingly than our own countrymen, who went out with the Expeditionary Force, or those others who have since responded to Lord Kitchener's appeal? Is there any reason to suppose that they are fighting any less bravely and intelligently?[8] Another matter of importance in these calculations with regard to the military strength of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the time limit. [Sidenote: THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR] There are three periods in war. There is the _onset_ of war, where swiftness of action is what tells most; there is the _grip_ of war, where numbers of {264} trained men are what tell most; and there is the _drag_ of war, when what tells most is the purse. Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers which tell all the way through. At the beginning--in the _onset_--the aim is to hurl superior numbers at a vital point--taking the enemy by surprise, and thereby disordering his whole plan of campaign--very much as you knock a limpet off a rock, with a sharp unexpected blow. If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are in the _grip_. Here it is a case of sheer heavy slogging of all the available trained troops. The weaker side is driven to the defensive. It is found making use of every artificial and natural advantage to counteract the superiority which threatens it, and which must speedily prevail, if only it be superior enough.