Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne)Palmer, Frederick
History
Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne)
Palmer, Frederick
Argonne, Battle of the, France, 1918; World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- Western Front
In no result was the fact more evident than in our traffic direction
that in making a large army we must crack the mold of a small army. In
time our capacity for organization would make a new mold. Meanwhile,
though it might be applied at cross-purposes, our American energy,
adaptable, tireless, furious, and determined, must bring results.
The many broken-down trucks in ditches beside the road were only the
inevitable casualties of a prodigious effort. Let the infantrymen keep
on advancing; we would force their supplies up to them in one way or
another.
VIII
THE FIRST DAY
Out in the open--The enemy limited to passive defense--And relying on
machine-gunners--Their elusiveness--Problems of the offense--Slowing
down--Up with the infantry--Why dispersion--_Liaison_ up, down,
and across--How keep the staff informed?--The spent wave before
Montfaucon.
What of the infantry lost to view in the folds of the landscape? They
were confronting the originals of the hills, woods, and ravines, whose
contours on paper had been the definite factor in making plans, while
the character and resistance of the enemy had been the indefinite and
ungovernable quantity. As the day advanced, irregular pencilings,
reflecting the reports of the progress of the fighters, moved forward
on the maps of the different headquarters toward the heavy regular
lines of the objectives which were the goals of our high ambition.
The loss of the first-line fortifications to the Germans could not be
considered as serious as in an offensive in the first years of the war.
Even as early as the Verdun battle, proponents of the mobile school
of warfare, who had never been altogether silenced by the engineering
school, had advocated a yielding elastic defense, which, after drawing
the Crown Prince's Armies away from their depots, would counter by
a sudden attack of the gathered French forces; but such a maneuver
was too daring and contrary to the thought of the time, with its
dependence upon rigid defense. Infantry had fallen into the habit of
feeling "undressed" and helpless unless in trenches. When the soldier
was forced into the open, he had hastened to hide his "nakedness" in
a shell-crater, or instantly, in the very rodent instinct that he had
developed, set to digging himself a pit. Since the German offensive of
March, 1918, all the practice had been to wean the infantry away from
settled defenses to the supple use of light artillery, trench mortars,
and machine-gun units. Happily, as we know, the basic training of our
infantry had been in keeping with this idea.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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