The average intelligent student of our Civil War a generation after the conflict ended, with Lincoln’s achievements in the grateful remembrance of every patriot, would naturally assume that Lincoln’s re-election to the Presidency in 1864 was never in any measure doubtful; but in fact three months after his renomination in Baltimore his defeat by General McClellan was generally apprehended by his friends and frankly conceded by Lincoln himself. On the 23d of August, 1864, he wrote the following with his signature appended: “This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to co-operate with the President-elect so as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot possibly save it afterward.” This paper he sealed and delivered to Secretary Welles with notice not to open it until after the election. [Illustration: ANDREW JOHNSON] There was very earnest opposition to Lincoln’s renomination by men of eminent ability and influential leadership in the Republican party. Chase, Wade, Henry Winter Davis, and Horace Greeley were bitterly opposed to accepting him as the Republican candidate for the second contest, as they believed that he could not be elected. In addition to these, Sumner was not heartily for him; Stevens was earnestly opposed to the President because he had not pressed confiscation and other punishments against the South, and the extreme radical wing of the Republican party was aggressive in its hostility. Lincoln’s strength was with the people, and they overwhelmed the leaders who sought his overthrow. The only exhibition of weakness I ever saw in Lincoln was exhibited during what might be called the contest for his renomination. There was, in point of fact, no contest at all, as after all the efforts of the opposing leaders had been exhausted the Republican people rallied to his support and asserted their mastery. He was painfully impressed with the apprehension that he might be defeated in the convention, and on a number of occasions I heard him discuss the question with a degree of interest that was painful. Even after a majority of all the delegates to the convention had been positively instructed for him, and certainly two-thirds of the remainder were publicly pledged to his support, he could not dismiss the fears of his possible defeat. I visited him several times within a month of the convention, in obedience to his telegrams, when he discussed only the political dangers which beset him. He told me that his name would go into history darkly shadowed by a fraternal war that he would be held responsible for inaugurating if he were unable to continue in office to conquer the Rebellion and restore the Union.