Our Presidents and how we make themMcClure, Alexander K. (Alexander Kelly)
History
Our Presidents and how we make them
McClure, Alexander K. (Alexander Kelly)
Presidents -- United States -- Election
I had private quarters at the Continental, while Cameron’s quarters
were at the Girard, and, as requested, advised Lincoln each day of
the apparent progress of the battle. My reports were not so assuring
as he desired, for the friends of McClellan, inspired by the partial
victory of October, renewed their energies for the November fight.
Postmaster-General Dennison came to see me on a special mission from
Lincoln about two weeks before the election to learn the situation as
precisely as possible, and I had to tell him that I saw but little hope
of carrying the State on the home vote. The army vote would doubtless
be largely for Lincoln and give him the State, but it would be declared
a “bayonet election,” and with such a result in Pennsylvania, and
New York lost, as was possible, while Lincoln’s election could not
be defeated, as the Southern States did not vote, the moral power of
the new administration to prosecute the war and attain peace would
be greatly impaired. My answer to Lincoln was that I would go to
Washington within a few days if it should appear necessary to take
extreme measures to save the State on the home vote.
As the political conditions did not improve, I telegraphed to Lincoln
that I would meet him at nine o’clock in the evening to discuss the
campaign. I found him nervously anxious about Pennsylvania, although
not doubting his re-election. He knew that New York was trembling in
the balance and might be lost, and his fears were fully warranted,
as he had but little over 6000 majority in a million votes. I told
him that I had not confidence in the State being carried by the home
vote, but that it could be done without interfering with the military
operations of the army, as Grant was then besieging Petersburg and
Sheridan had whipped the Confederates clear out of the valley. I
suggested that he should in some way have Grant furlough five thousand
Pennsylvania soldiers home for twenty days, and that Sheridan should do
the same, as that vote cast at home would insure a home majority. He
hesitated about making the request of Grant for reasons which I could
not understand, and I then suggested that General Meade was a soldier
and a gentleman, and that he could safely send an order to him as
Commander of the Army of the Potomac, and that Meade would obey it and
permit the order to be returned.
A messenger from the War Office went the next morning to Meade,
bearing the order from Lincoln, brought it back with him, and fully
five thousand Pennsylvania soldiers were furloughed to return home. I
said: “How about Sheridan?” Lincoln’s face brightened and with great
enthusiasm he said:
“Oh, Phil; he’s all right.”
The same order went to Sheridan, of which no record was ever kept, and
Sheridan sent five thousand of his veterans home to vote as they shot,
and Lincoln’s majority on the home vote was 5712, to which the army
vote added 14,363, making a total majority in the State of 20,075.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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