During the winter, the gunboat navy of the West was largely augmented and improved, under the admirable supervision of Commodore Foote. Ordinary river steamers were shorn of their top works, and their hulls converted into iron-clad batteries, which promised to render efficient service in operations on the navigable streams of the West. The brave old salt was ably seconded by Halleck and by Grant, both in building and in manning his fleet. General Smith, on his return from the reconnoissance in force, reported to Grant that the capture of Fort Henry was feasible. The general of the district was ready at an early day to solve the problem of breaking the rebel line of defence. He had kept his eye and his thought on this operation; and while the movement was demanded by McClellan, then general-in-chief, Halleck appears hardly to have turned his attention in that direction; certainly he had taken no active measure to carry out the purpose. I am not willing to say that Grant at this time had devised a plan for extended operations towards the South, but I am confident that he was studying his maps and measuring the comparative resources of the two armies long before his superiors had any definite ideas on the subject. I firmly believe that to him belongs the conception of that grand military movement which he so gloriously carried forward in person. On the return of Smith from his expedition, Grant forwarded his report to General Halleck, and a day later, by permission, visited the headquarters of the commander of the department at St. Louis, in order to obtain permission to attack Fort Henry. Halleck was one of the high and mighty men, and his refusal was abrupt and sharp. Grant was no orator. He proffered his request in the fewest words that would express it; and he did not attempt to sustain his views by an argument. He was wounded in his feelings by the curtness of his superior, and returned to Cairo with the unpleasant impression that his commander regarded him as a tyro, capable of perpetrating the grossest military blunder. But Grant had Fort Henry on the brain, and, in spite of his repulse, he could not be satisfied to leave with his superior the responsibility of neglecting to improve what he regarded as a golden opportunity. In the latter part of January he telegraphed to Halleck that, with his permission, he would take and hold Fort Henry, establish and hold a large camp there. A day later he followed up his application with a letter, demonstrating the practicability of the proposed enterprise, and showing the advantage to be gained by a prompt advance. His application was warmly seconded by Flag-officer Foote; and this time the desired permission was obtained. Grant was happy then; he had overcome the coldness of Halleck, and it only remained for him to justify his predictions.