"It is an essentially new departure in international affairs, and it is in order for the sticklers for precedent to enter fussy protestation, as they did in connection with the Venezuelan question, against the Monroe doctrine, declaring it was not to be found in the code of international law. It is certainly very unusual, if not unprecedented, for the government to make a relief appropriation for its own people in some foreign land. The truth is, this Cuban situation is wholly exceptional. Here is a little island in a state of civil war. It is largely a sectional war, one part of the island being in possession of one of the belligerents, and the other section in possession of the other belligerent. "Several hundreds of our American citizens are in that section of the island occupied by Spanish armies, and are suffering, in common with the Cubans themselves, from a deliberate policy of starvation. Weyler is trying to conquer by famine. That is his fixed purpose, and, from the nature of the case, no discrimination is made between Spanish subjects in rebellion and American citizens sojourning in the island. If the policy of starvation cannot be maintained without this indiscrimination then so much the worse for Weyler and his policy. Congress has only to make the appropriation asked for, and the relief will go forward, without regard to any collateral consequences." DE LOME'S INSULTING LETTER. One of the most sensational incidents in connection with Spanish affairs prior to the destruction of the Maine was the publication of a letter, which fell into the hands of the Cuban Junta, written by Senor Dupuy De Lome, the representative of the Spanish government in Washington, to the editor of a newspaper at Madrid. A translation of the letter is given: My Distinguished and Dear Friend: You need not apologize for not having written to me. I ought to have written to you, but have not done so on account of being weighed down with work. The situation here continues unchanged. Everything depends on the political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method of warfare will end the day that the Colonial Cabinet will be appointed, and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility of what may happen there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the Cubans, whom they believe to be so immaculate. Until then we will not be able to see clearly, and I consider it to be a loss of time and an advance by the wrong road, the sending of emissaries to the rebel field, the negotiating with the autonomists, not yet declared to be legally constituted, and the discovery of the intentions and purposes of this government. The exiles will return one by one, and when they return will come walking into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will gradually return.