From this point of view morality is a life of _aspiration_, and of _faith_; there is required constant willingness to give up past goods as the good, and to press on to new ends; not because past achievements are bad, but because, being good, they have created a situation which demands larger and more intricately related achievements. This willingness is aspiration and it implies _faith_. Only the old good is of sight, has verified itself to sense. The new ideal, the end which meets the situation, is felt as good only in so far as the character has formed the conviction that to meet obligation is itself a good, whether bringing sensible satisfaction or not. You can prove to a man that he ought to act so and so (that is to say, that such an act is the one which fits the present occasion), but you cannot _prove_ to him that the performance of that duty will be good. Only faith in the moral order, in the identity of duty and the good, can assert this. Every time an agent takes as his end (that is, chooses as good) an activity which he has not already tried, he asserts his belief in the goodness of right action as such. This faith is not a mere intellectual thing, but it is practical--the staking of self upon activity as against passive possession. LXVII. Moral Badness. Badness originates in the contrast which thus comes about between _having_ the repetition of former action, and _doing_--pressing forward to the new right action. Goodness is the choice of doing; the refusal to be content with past good as exhausting the entire content of goodness. It is, says Green, 'in the continued effort to be better that goodness consists'. The man, however bad his past and however limited his range of intellectual, æsthetic and social activity, who is dissatisfied with his past, and whose dissatisfaction manifests itself in act, is accounted better than the man of a respectable past and higher plane of life who has lapsed into contented acquiescence with past deeds. For past deeds are not _deeds_, they are passive enjoyments. The bad man, on the other hand, is not the man who loves badness _in and for itself_. Such a man would be a mad man or a devil. All conduct, bad as well as good, is for the sake of _some_ satisfaction, that is, some good. In the bad man, the satisfaction which is aimed at is _simply_ the one congruent with existing inclinations, irrespective of the sufficiency of those inclinations in view of the changed capacity and environment: it is a good of _having_. The bad man, that is to say, does not recognize any _ideal_ or _active_ good; any good which has not already commended itself to him as such. This good may be good in _itself_; but, as distinguished from the good which requires action, that which would fulfill the present capacity or meet the present situation, it is bad.