Outlines of a Critical Theory of EthicsDewey, John
Philosophy
Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics
Dewey, John
Ethics
3. Interest in Science and Art. Man is interested in the world about
him; the knowledge of the nature and relations of this world become one
of his most absorbing pursuits. Man identifies himself with the meaning
of this world to the point that he can be satisfied only as he spells
out and reads its meaning. (See, for example, Browning's "Grammarian's
Funeral".) The scientific interest is no less a controlling motive
of man than the personal interest. This knowledge is not a means for
having agreeable sensations; it is not dilettanteism or "love of
culture"; it is interest in the large and goodly frame of things. And
so it is with art; man has interests which can be satisfied only in the
reconstruction of nature in the way of the useful and the beautiful.
I have made no distinction between 'fine' and 'useful' art.
The discussion of this question does not belong here, but
the rigid separation of them in æsthetic theory seems to me
to have no justification. Both are products of intelligence
in the service of interests, and the only difference is in
the range of intelligence and interests concerned. 'Use'
is a _limited_ service and hence implies an external end;
beauty is complete use or service, and hence not mere use
at all, but self-expression. Historically, all art which
has not been merely sentimental and 'literary' has sprung
from interest in good workmanship in the realizing of an
idea.
It seems as if here interests violated their general law, and, in the
case of use at least, were an interest in some ulterior end. But it
may be questioned whether a carpenter whose aim was consciously beyond
the work he was doing, would be a good workman--and this whether the
further end is his own private advantage, or social benefit at large.
The thought of the further benefit to self and of the utility to accrue
to some one else, will, if it becomes a _part_ of what he is doing,
undoubtedly intensify his interest--it must do so, for it enlarges
its content. But to _identify_ one's own or another's well-being with
work, and to make the work a mere _means_ to this welfare, are two
quite different things. The good artisan "has his heart in his work".
His self-respect makes it necessary for him to respect this technical
or artistic capacity, and to do the best by it that he can without
scrimping or lowering. To a good business man business is not the mere
means to money-making; and it is sentimentalism (and hence immoral) to
demand that it be a mere means to the good of society. The business, if
it is a moral one (and _any_ business, _so far_ as it is thus carried
on, is moral), is carried on for the sake of the activity itself, as a
realizing of capacity in a specific situation.
XXXVI.
The Moral Quality of Science.
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