On the model, however, of the action of this external authority there grows up, in time an internal authority--"an ideal resemblance of public authority" (p. 287), or "a _fac simile_ of the system of government around us" (p. 313). "The sentiment, at first formed and cultivated by the relations of actual command and obedience, may come at last to stand upon an independent foundation.... When the young mind, accustomed at the outset to implicitly obeying any set of rules is sufficiently advanced to appreciate the motive--the utilities or the sentiment that led to their imposition--the character of the conscience is entirely changed.... Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power" (E. and W., p. 318). But when the sense of obligation becomes entirely detached from the social sanction, "even then the notion, sentiment or form of duty is derived from what society imposes, although the particular matter is quite different. Social obligation develops in the mind originally the feeling and habit of obligation, and this remains although the particular articles are changed" (page 319, note). _Cf._ also Bain, Moral Science, pp. 20-21 and 41-43. XLIV. Spencer's Theory of Obligation. Spencer's theory is, in substance, an enlarged and better analyzed restatement of Bain's theory. Bain nowhere clearly states in what the essence of obligation consists, when it becomes independent, when the internal _fac simile_ is formed. _Why_ should I not gratify my desires as I please in case social pressure is absent or lets up? Spencer supplies the missing element. According to him, "the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings" (Data of Ethics, p. 113). The kind of feeling which controls is that which is more complex and which relates to more remote ends; or, we are 'obliged' to give up more immediate, special and direct pleasures for the sake of securing more general, remote and indirect ones. Obligation, in its essence, is the surrender or subordination of present to future satisfaction. This control, restraint, or suppression may be 'independent' or, self-imposed, but is not so at first, either in the man or in the child. Prior to self-restraint are the restraints imposed by the "visible ruler, the invisible ruler and society at large"--the policeman, the priest and public opinion. The man is induced to postpone immediate gratification through his fear of others, especially of the chief, of the dead and of social displeasure--"legal penalty, supernatural punishment and social reprobation". Thus there grows up the sense of obligation. This refers at first only to the above-mentioned extrinsic effects of action. But finally the mind learns to consider the intrinsic effect