The facts, relied upon by Bain and Spencer, as to the part played by social influences in imposing duties, are undeniable. The facts, however, are unaccountable upon the theory of these writers, as that theory would, as we have seen, explain only the influence of society in producing acts done from fear or for hope of reward. But if the individual and others are equally members of one society, if the performance by each man of his own function constitutes a good common to all, it is inevitable that social authorities should be an influence in constituting and teaching duties. The community, in imposing its own needs and demands upon the individual, is simply arousing him to a knowledge of his relationships in life, to a knowledge of the moral environment in which he lives, and of the acts which he must perform if he is to realize his individuality. The community in awakening moral consciousness in the morally immature may appeal to motives of hope and fear. But even this fact does not mean that to the child, duty is necessarily constituted by fear of punishment or hope of reward. It means simply that his capacity and his surroundings are both so undeveloped that the exercise of his function takes mainly the form of pleasing others. He may still do his duty _as_ his duty, but his duty now consists in pleasing others. On Obligation see Green, Op. cit., pp. 352-356; Alexander, Op. cit., pp. 142-147. For different views, Martineau, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 92-119; Calderwood, Op. cit., pp. 131-138, and see also, Grote, Treatise on Moral Ideals, ch. VII. CHAPTER III.--THE IDEA OF FREEDOM. XLIX. The Forms of Freedom. We may now deal, more briefly, with the problem of moral capacity. It is, in principle, the ability to conceive of an end and to be governed in action by this conceived end. We may consider this capacity in three aspects, as negative, as potential and as positive. 1. _Negative Aspect of Freedom._ The power to be governed in action by the thought of some end to be reached is freedom _from_ the appetites and desires. An animal which does not have the power of proposing ends to itself is impelled to action by its wants and appetites just as they come into consciousness. It is _irritated_ into acting. Each impulse demands its own satisfaction, and the animal is helpless to rise above the particular want. But a _person_, one who can direct his action by conscious ends, is emancipated from subjection to the particular appetites. He can consider their relation to the end which he has set before himself, and can reject, modify or use them as best agrees with the purposed end. This capacity to control and subjugate impulses by reflection upon their relationship to a rational end is the power of self-government, and the more distinct and the more comprehensive in scope the end is, the more real the self-government.