[363] MS. [364] _Writings of Washington_, ix. 273. [365] Madison, _Letters_, etc. i. 356. [366] _Ibid._ i. 364-365. [367] Madison, _Letters_, etc. i. 378. [368] _Ibid._ i. 387. [369] Madison, _Letters_, i. 388. [370] Bancroft, _Hist. Const._, ii. 465. [371] _Writings of Washington_, ix. 356. [372] Rives, _Life of Madison_, ii. 544, note. [373] Rives, _Life of Madison_, ii. 541. [374] _Hist. Mag._ for 1873, 274. [375] Elliot, _Debates_, i. 491; v. 502, 534-535. [376] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. [377] Curtis, _Hist. Const._ ii. 561, note. [378] _Writings of Washington_, ix. 266, note. [379] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 161, 57, 63. [380] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 23, 52, 44, 156. [381] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 150, 462, 445-446. [382] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 149-150. [383] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 58-60. [384] Bancroft, _Hist. Const._ ii. 459-460. [385] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 653. [386] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 652. [387] Bancroft, _Hist. Const._ ii. 316-317. [388] Rives, _Life of Madison_, ii. 610. [389] Kennedy, _Life of Wirt_, i. 345. [390] Spencer Roane, MS. [391] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 187. [392] _Ibid._ iii. 406, 104, 248, 177. [393] St. George Tucker, MS. [394] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 580. [395] St. George Tucker, MS. [396] Elliot, _Debates_, iii. 625. [397] Wirt, 296-297. Also Spencer Roane, MS. CHAPTER XIX THE AFTER-FIGHT FOR AMENDMENTS Thus, on the question of adopting the new Constitution, the fight was over; but on the question of amending that Constitution, now that it had been adopted, the fight, of course, was only just begun. For how could this new Constitution be amended? A way was provided,--but an extremely strait and narrow way. No amendment whatsoever could become valid until it had been accepted by three fourths of the States; and no amendment could be submitted to the States for their consideration until it had first been approved, either by two thirds of both houses of Congress, or else by a majority of a convention specially called by Congress at the request of two thirds of the States. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the supreme law of the land, when once agreed to, should have within it a principle of fixedness almost invincible. At any rate, the process by which alone alterations can be made, involves so wide an area of territory, so many distinct groups of population, and is withal, in itself, so manifold and complex, so slow, and so liable to entire stoppage, that any proposition looking toward change must inevitably perish long before reaching the far-away goal of final endorsement, unless that proposition be really impelled by a public demand not only very energetic and persistent, but well-nigh universal. Indeed, the constitutional provision for amendments seemed, at that time, to many, to be almost a constitutional prohibition of amendments.