A French Minister has said that the success of the war loans for 151 milliards in Germany, and the increase of bank deposits for a sum of 28 milliards, coinciding with an increase of capital of 45 milliards in limited companies, demonstrate that Germany has saved at least 180 milliards in four years. Leaving aside the exactness of these figures, it is really sad to observe reasoning of this type. How can the public have an idea of the reality? Let us apply the same reasoning to France. We must say that inasmuch as France before the War had a public debt of 32 milliards, and now has a debt of 265 milliards, without calculating what she owes to Great Britain and the United States, France, by reason of the War, has immensely enriched herself, since, leaving aside the debt contracted abroad and the previous debt, she has saved during the War 200 milliards, quite apart from the increase in bank deposits and the increase in capital of limited companies. The War has therefore immensely enriched her. In reality we are face to face with one of the phenomena of the intoxication brought about by paper money, by means of which it has been possible at certain times for the public to believe that the War had increased wealth. Other features of this phenomenon we have in the wretched example of the capitalist classes, after which it was not unnatural that the people should give way to a great increase in consumption, should demand high wages and offer little work in return at the very time when it was most necessary to work more and consume less. There is small cause for wonder that certain erroneous ideas are diffused among the public when they have their being in those very sophisms according to which the indemnity to be paid by the beaten enemy will pay all the debts and losses of the conquering nations. We are told that Germany, being responsible for the War, must impose on herself a regime of restrictions and organize herself as an exporting nation for the payment of the reparation debts. Here again the question can be considered in two ways, according as it is proposed to allow Germany a free commerce or to impose on her a series of forced cessions of goods in payment of the reparations. Both hypotheses can be entertained, but both, as we shall see, lead to economic disorder in the conquering States, if these relations are to be regulated by violence. It is useless to dilate on the other aphorisms, or rather sophisms, which were seriously discussed at the Paris Conference, and which had even the honour of being sustained by the technical experts: 1. That it is not important to know what Germany can pay, but it is sufficient to know what she ought to pay. 2. That no one can foresee what immense resources Germany will develop within thirty or forty years, and what Germany will not be able to pay will be paid by the Allies. 3. That Germany, under the stimulus of a military occupation, will increase her production in an unheard-of manner.