If we are anxious to realize a peace politic two things are necessary: 1. That France has security, and that for twenty years at least Great Britain and Italy pledge themselves to defend her in case of aggression. 2. That the measures for the disarmament of the conquered States be maintained, maybe with some tempering of their conditions, and that their execution and control be entrusted with the amplest powers to the League of Nations. No one can think it unjust that the parties who provoked the War or those who have, if not the entire, at least the greatest share of responsibility, should be rendered for a certain time incapable. The fall of the military caste in Germany and the formation of a democratic society will derive much help from the abolition, for a not too brief period of time, of the permanent army, and this will render possible, at no distant date, an effective reduction of the armaments in the victorious countries. Great Britain has the moral duty to proffer a guarantee already spontaneously given. Italy also must give such a guarantee if she wishes truly to contribute towards the peace of Europe. As long as Germany has no fleet, and cannot put together an artillery and an aviation corps, she cannot present a menace. Great Britain and Italy can, however, only give their guarantees on the condition that they guarantee a proper state of things and not a continued condition of violence. The withdrawal of all the troops from the Rhine ought to coincide with a clear definition concerning the fate of the Germans of Austria and the Germans detached from Germany without motive. Such a retirement must coincide with the definition of the territory of the Saar, and the assigning, pure and simple, of Upper Silesia to Germany and the end of all the insupportable controls and the indemnity regulations. Being myself contrary to any pledge binding Italy for too long a period, I am of opinion that it is perfectly right that Great Britain and Italy should make this sacrifice for the peace of Europe. But no guarantee is possible, either for Great Britain or Italy, until the most essential problems be resolved in the justest manner by means of straightforward and explicit understandings. Italy's tendency towards British policy on the continent of Europe depends on the fact that Great Britain has never wished or tolerated that any continental State should have a hegemony over others. And, therefore, she has found herself at different epochs ranged against France, Germany and Russia. England is in the Mediterranean solely to secure her passage through it, not to dominate it. She continues to follow the grand policy by which she has transformed her colonies into dominions, and, in spite of errors, she has always shown the greatest respect for the liberty of other peoples.