This systematization, which can only be imposed by the free agreement of the United States and Great Britain, would have the effect of creating excellent relations. The United States, cancelling their, in great part, impossible debt, would derive the advantage of developing their trade and industry, and thus be able to guarantee credits for private individuals in Europe. It would also be of advantage to Great Britain, who would lose nothing. Great Britain has about an equal number of debits and credits, with this difference, that the debits are secured, while the credits are, in part, unsecured. France's credits are proportionately the worst and her debits largest, almost 27 milliards. France, liberated from her debt, and in a position to calculate on a coal situation comparable with that of before the War and with her new territories, would be in a position to re-establish herself. The cancellation of 27 milliards of debt, a proportionate share in 20 milliards, together with all that she has had, represent on the whole a sum that perhaps exceeds 50 milliards. Italy would have the advantage of possessing for ten years the minimum of coal necessary to her existence, and would be liberated from her foreign debt, which amounts to much more than she can possibly hope for from the indemnity. Such an arrangement, or one like it, is the only way calculated to allow Europe to set out again on the path of civilization and to re-establish slowly that economic equilibrium which the War has destroyed with enormous damage for the conquerors and the certain ruin of the vanquished. But, before speaking of any indemnity, the Reparations Commission must be abolished and its functions handed over to the League of Nations, while all the useless controls and other hateful vexations must be put an end to. While the Allied troops' occupation of the Rhine costs Germany 25 milliards of paper marks a year, it is foolish to speak of reconstruction or indemnity. Either all occupation must cease or the expenses ought not to exceed, according to the foregoing agreements, a maximum of 80 millions at par, or even less. We shall, however, never arrive at such an arrangement until the Continental countries become convinced of two things: first, that the United States will grant no credits under any formula; secondly, that Germany, under the present system, will be unable to pay anything and will collapse, dragging down to ruin her conquerors. Among many uncertainties these two convictions become ever clearer.