Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
That all other animals, besides man, want reason, your _Author_
endeavours to prove in his _discourse of method_, where his chief
argument is, That other animals cannot express their mind, thoughts or
conceptions, either by speech or any other signs, as man can do: For,
sayes he, _it is not for want of the organs belonging to the framing
of words, as we may observe in Parrats and Pies, which are apt enough
to express words they are taught, but understand nothing of them._ My
answer is, That one man expressing his mind by speech or words to an
other, doth not declare by it his excellency and supremacy above all
other Creatures, but for the most part more folly, for a talking man
is not so wise as a contemplating man. But by reason other Creatures
cannot speak or discourse with each other as men, or make certain
signs, whereby to express themselves as dumb and deaf men do, should we
conclude, they have neither knowledge, sense, reason, or intelligence?
Certainly, this is a very weak argument; for one part of a mans body,
as one hand, is not less sensible then the other, nor the heel less
sensible then the heart, nor the legg less sensible then the head,
but each part hath its sense and reason, and so consequently its
sensitive and rational knowledg; and although they cannot talk or give
intelligence to each other by speech, nevertheless each hath its own
peculiar and particular knowledge, just as each particular man has his
own particular knowledge, for one man's knowledge is not another man's
knowledge; and if there be such a peculiar and particular knowledg in
every several part of one animal creature, as man, well may there be
such in Creatures of different kinds and sorts: But this particular
knowledg belonging to each creature, doth not prove that there is no
intelligence at all betwixt them, no more then the want of humane
Knowledg doth prove the want of Reason; for Reason is the rational
part of matter, and makes perception, observation, and intelligence
different in every creature, and every sort of creatures, according
to their proper natures, but perception, observation and intelligence
do not make reason, Reason being the cause, and they the effects.
Wherefore though other Creatures have not the speech, nor Mathematical
rules and demonstrations, with other Arts and Sciences, as Men; yet may
their perceptions and observations be as wise as Men's, and they may
have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after their
own manner and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave them,
and Man to his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting,
Madam,
_Your faithful Friend,_
_and Servant._
XXXVII.
_MADAM,_
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