Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
I understand by your last, that you are very desirous to know, _Whether
there be not in nature such animal creatures both for purity and size,
as we are not capable to perceive by our sight._ Truly, _Madam_, in
my opinion it is very probable there may be animal creatures of such
rare bodies as are not subject to our exterior senses, as well, as
there are elements which are not subject to all our exterior senses:
as for example, fire is onely subject to our sight and feeling, and
not to any other sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, touch
and hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our sight,
taste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing; and vapour is onely
subject to our sight, and wind onely to our hearing; but pure air
is not subject to any of our senses, but onely known by its effects:
and so there may likewise be animal creatures which are not subject
to any of our senses both for their purity and life; as for example,
I have seen pumpt out of a water pump small worms which could hardly
be discerned but by a bright Sun-light, for they were smaller then
the smallest hair, some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, but
though they were the smallest creatures that ever I did see, yet they
were more agil and fuller of life, then many a creature of a bigger
size, and so small they were, as I am confident, they were neither
subject to tast, smell, touch nor hearing, but onely to sight, and
that neither without difficulty, requiring both a sharp sight and a
clear light to perceive them; and I do verily believe that these small
animal creatures may be great in comparison to others which may be
in nature. But if it be probable that there may be such small animal
creatures in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses, by
reason of their littleness; it is also probable, that there may be
such great and big animal creatures in nature as are beyond the reach
and knowledg of our exterior senses; for bigness and smallness are not
to be judged by our exterior senses, onely; but as sense and reason
inform us, that there are different degrees in Purity and Rarity, so
also in shapes, figures and sizes in all natural creatures. Next you
desired to know, _Whether there can be an artificial Life, or a Life
made by Art?_ My answer is, Not; for although there is Life in all
natures parts, yet not all the parts are life, for there is one part of
natural matter which in its nature is inanimate or without life, and
though natural Life doth produce Art, yet Art cannot produce natural
Life, for though Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self:
not but that there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is
natural, and not artificial; and thus the several parts of a watch
may have sense and reason according to the nature of their natural
figure, which is steel, but not as they have an artificial shape, for
Art cannot put Life into the watch, Life being onely natural, not
artificial.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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