make her a Jointure. But leaving those strange opinions to the fancies of their Authors, I'le add no more, but that I am, Madam, _Your faithful Friend,_ _and Servant._ [1] _Antid. l._ 3. _c._ 15. _a._ 3. VII. _MADAM,_ Your _Author_ being very earnest in arguing against those that maintain the opinion of Matter being self-moving, amongst the rest of his arguments brings in this:[1] _Suppose_, says he, _Matter could move it self, would meer Matter with self-motion amount to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see in the World?--All the evasion I can imagine, our adversaries may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable of sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined sense; and consequently of Imagination too, yea happily of Reason and Understanding._ I answer, it is very probable, that not onely all the Matter in the World or Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that the sensitive part of matter is the builder, and the rational the designer; whereof I have spoken of before, and you may find more of it in my Book of Philosophy. _But,_ says your Author, _Let us see, if all their heads laid together can contrive the anatomical Fabrick of any Creature that liveth?_ I answer, all parts of Nature are not bound to have heads or tayls; but if they have, surely they are wiser then many a man's. _I demand_, says he, _Has every one of these Particles, that must have a hand in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole design of the work by the Impress of some Phantasme upon it? or as they have several offices, so have they several parts of the design?_ I answer, All the actions of self-moving Matter are not Impresses, nor is every part a hand-labourer, but every part unites by degrees into such or such a Figure. Again, says he, _How is it conceiveable that any one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there not existing, yet in Nature an animal) can have the Idea Impressed of that Creature they are to frame?_ I answer, all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can be in Nature, are existent in nature. _How_, says he, _can they in framing several parts confer notes? by what language or speech can they communicate their Counsels one to another?_ I answer, Knowledg doth not always require speech, for speech is an effect and not a cause, but knowledg is a cause and not an effect; and nature hath infinite more ways to express knowledg then man can imagine, _Wherefore_, he concludes, _that they should mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible, then that so many men, blind and dumb from their nativity, should joyn their forces and wits together to build a Castle, or carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of them knew any more in several, then some one of the smallest parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole._ I answer, Nature is neither blind nor dumb, nor any ways defective, but infinitely wise and knowing;