But he does seem to hold at least that _many_ of our true ideas are mutable. And even this proposition seems to me to be disputable. It seems to me that there is a sense in which it is the case with _every_ true idea that, if once true, it is always true. That is to say, that every idea, which is true once, _would_ be true at any other time at which it were to occur; and that every idea which does occur more than once, if true once, _is_ true at every time at which it does occur. There seems to me, I say, to be _a sense_ in which this is so. And this seems to me to be the sense in which it is most commonly and most naturally maintained that all truths are "immutable." Professor James seems to mean to deny it, even in this sense. He seems to me constantly to speak as if there were _no_ sense in which _all_ truths are immutable. And I only wish to point out what seems to me to be the plainest and most obvious objection to such language. And, first of all, there is one doctrine, which he seems to connect with this of his that "truths are mutable," with regard to which I fully agree with him. He seems very anxious to insist that reality is mutable: that it does change, and that it is not irrational to hope that in the future it will be different from and much better than it is now. And this seems to me to be quite undeniable. It seems to me quite certain that I do have ideas at one time which I did not have at another; that change, therefore, does really occur. It seems to me quite certain that in the future many things will be different from what they are now; and I see no reason to think that they may not be much better. There is much misery in the world now; and I think it is quite possible that some day there will really be much less. This view that _reality_ is mutable, that _facts_ do change, that some things have properties at one time which they do not have at other times, seems to me certainly true. And so far, therefore, as Professor James merely means to assert this obvious fact, I have no objection to his view. Some philosophers, I think, have really implied the denial of this fact. All those who deny the reality of time do seem to me to imply that nothing really changes or can change--that, in fact, reality is wholly immutable. And so far as Professor James is merely protesting against this view, I should, therefore, agree with him.