It is easy to see that it is not. I may have the belief that it will
rain to-morrow. And I may have "made" myself have this belief. It may
be the case that I should not have had it, but for peculiarities in my
past experiences, in my interests and my volitions. It may be the case
that I should not have had it, but for a deliberate attempt to consider
the question whether it will rain or not. This may easily happen. And
certainly this particular belief of mine would not have been true,
unless it existed. Its truth, therefore, depends, in a sense, upon any
conditions upon which its existence depends. And this belief may be
true. It will be true, if It does rain to-morrow. But, in spite of all
these reasons, would anyone think of saying that, in case it is true, I
had _made_ it true? Would anyone say that I had had any hand _at all_
in making it true? Plainly no one would. We should say that I had a
hand in making it true, if and only If I had a hand in _making the rain
fall._ In every case in which we believe in the existence of anything,
past or future, we should say that we had helped to make the belief
true, if and only if we had helped to cause the existence of the fact
which, in that belief, we believed did exist or would exist. Surely
this is plain. I may believe that the sun will rise to-morrow. And I
may have had a hand in "making" this belief; certainly it often depends
for its existence upon what has been previously in my mind. And if the
sun does rise, my belief will have been true. I have, therefore, had
a hand in making a true belief. But would anyone say that, therefore,
I had a hand in _making this belief true_? Certainly no one would. No
one would say that anything had contributed to make this belief true,
except those conditions (whatever they may be) which contributed to
making the sun actually rise.
It is plain, then, that by "making a belief true," we mean something
quite different from what Professor James means by "making" that
belief. Conditions which have a hand in making a given true belief,
may (it appears) have no hand at all in making it true; and conditions
which have a hand in making it true may have no hand at all in making
_it._ Certainly this is how we use the words. We should never say that
we had made a belief true, merely because we had made the belief. But
now, which of these two things does Professor James mean? Does he mean
_merely_ the accepted commonplace that we make our true beliefs, in the
sense that almost all of them depend for their existence on what has
been previously in some human mind? Or does he mean also that we _make
them true_--that their truth also depends on what has been previously
in some human mind?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account