That the very same words may be true at one time and false at another--that they may express a truth at one time and a falsehood at another. That the existence of most, if not all, of our beliefs, true as well as false, does depend upon previous events in our mental history; that we should never have had the particular beliefs we do have, had not our previous mental history been such as it was. That the truth, and not merely the existence, of _some_ of our beliefs, does depend upon us. That we really do make some alterations in the world, and that hence we do help to "make true" all those of our beliefs which are beliefs in the existence of these alterations. To all of these propositions I have no objection to offer. And they seem to me to be generally admitted commonplaces. A certain class of philosophers do, indeed, imply the denial of every one of them--namely, those philosophers who deny the reality of time. And I think that part of Professor James' object is to protest against the views of these philosophers. All of these propositions do constitute a protest against such views; and so far they might be all that Professor James meant to assert. But I do not think that anyone, fairly reading through what he says, could get the impression that these things, and nothing more, were what he had in his mind. What gives colour and interest to what he says, seems to be obviously something quite different. And, if we try to find out what exactly the chief things are which give his discussion its colour and interest, it seems to me we may distinguish that what he has in his mind, wrapped up in more or less ambiguous language, are the following propositions, to all of which I have tried to urge what seem to me the most obvious objections:-- That utility is a property which distinguishes true beliefs from those which are not true; that, therefore, _all_ true beliefs are useful, and _all_ beliefs, which are useful, are true--by "utility" being sometimes meant "utility on at least one occasion," sometimes "utility in the long run," sometimes "utility for some length of time." That all beliefs which are useful for some length of time are true. That utility is the _only_ property which all true beliefs have in common: that, therefore, _if_ it were useful to me to believe in Professor James' existence, this belief _would_ be true, even if he didn't exist; and that, _if_ it were not useful to me to believe this, the belief _would_ be false, even if he did. That the beliefs, which we express by words, and not merely the words themselves, may be true at one time and _not_ true at another; and that this is a general rule, though perhaps there may be some exceptions.