holds, never know any fact whatever, which I have not myself observed, unless I have observed similar facts in the past and have observed that they were "conjoined" (directly or indirectly) with facts similar to some fact which I do now observe or remember. In this sense, he holds, _all_ our knowledge of facts, beyond the reach of our own observation, is founded on _experience._ This is Hume's primary principle. But what consequences does he think will follow from it, as to the kind of facts, beyond our own observation, which we can know? We may, I think, distinguish three entirely different views as to its consequences, which he suggests in different parts of his work. In the first place, where he is specially engaged in explaining this primary principle, he certainly seems to suppose that all propositions of the kind, which we assume most universally in everyday life, may be founded on experience in the sense required. He supposes that we have this foundation in experience for such beliefs as that "a stone will fall, or fire burn"; that Julius Caesar was murdered; that the sun will rise to-morrow; that all men are mortal He speaks as if experience did not merely render such beliefs probable, but actually _proved_ them to be true. The "arguments from experience" in their favour are, he says, such as "leave no room for doubt or opposition." The only kinds of belief, which he definitely mentions as _not_ founded on experience, are "popular superstitions" on the one hand, and certain religious and philosophical beliefs, on the other. He seems to suppose that a few (a very few) religious beliefs may, perhaps, be founded on experience. But as regards most of the specific doctrines of Christianity, for example, he seems to be clear that they are not so founded. The belief in miracles is not founded on experience; nor is the philosophical belief that every event is caused by the direct volition of the Deity. In short, it would seem, that in this doctrine that our knowledge of unobserved facts is confined to such as are "founded on experience," he means to draw the line very much where it is drawn by the familiar doctrine which is called "Agnosticism." We can know such facts as are asserted in books on "history, geography or astronomy," or on "politics, physics and chemistry," because such assertions may be "founded on experience"; but we cannot know the greater part of the facts asserted in books "of divinity or school metaphysics," because such assertions have no foundation in experience.