The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins existed before I saw them, _what_ I know is that something existed at that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now exist. And, of course, this belief _may_ be a mere prejudice. It _may_ be that when I believe that I _now_ have, in my body, blood and nerves and brain, _what_ I believe is only true, if it does _not_ assert, in the proper sense of the word "existence," the _present_ existence of anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor _would_ have, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence I know, can be. (2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something _by description_; and it seems pretty clear that the description by which I know it is as _the_ thing which has a certain connection with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. But _what_ connection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by "that half-crown" I mean _the_ thing which _caused_ my experience of this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just as much _causes_ of my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular _kind_ of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not got--a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its "source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I may perhaps be knowing that the _source_ of this experience is circular. But what sort of a thing can this "source" be?