Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time, _in a certain character_, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time _has not_ reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time _is not_ real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, "like space, has most evidently proved _not to be real,_ but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that Time _is not_ real. But there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice. In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion "Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time, _in the character which it exhibits,_ neither has nor belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, be meant to imply that, in some _other_ character--some character which it does _not_ exhibit--Time _has_ reality and does belong to it. And I shall presently have something to say about this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out. However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that _in some sense,_ at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:--