we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart is like. We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones. But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr. Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, in the character which it exhibits, neither is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is a fact, _nor_ is. We should have to suppose him to be using all these four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it is _only_ in its other character that Time either exists, or is a fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits." Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary, he means to affirm emphatically that Time _even_ in the character which it exhibits, does exist, _is_ a fact, and indubitably _is,_ though it is _not_ real in that character. In the second passage, for instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist, are facts, and indubitably _are,_ he is, I think, plainly talking of appearances, in the character which they exhibit--or, as he there puts it, their nature, _as it is_--he does, I think, mean that appearances, even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third passage, where he says, Change _is_ a fact, and this fact, _as such,_ is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such--change, in the _character which it exhibits_--change, _as it is, is_ a fact: though, of course, he holds that _in_ this character it certainly is not real. I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another. His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making a distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, and it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that Time, _as such, neither_ is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is a fact, _nor_ is; but, on the contrary, that Time, even _as such,_ does exist, _is_