Many philosophers, who take the view that the presented objects about which we make these judgments are sensations of ours, and some even who do not, are in the habit of talking of _"the_ causes" of these objects as if we knew, in the case of each, that it had one and only one cause; and many of them seem to think that this part of the surface of this inkstand could be correctly described as _the_ cause of this presented object. They suggest, therefore, the view that what I am judging in this case might be: "This presented object has one and only one cause, and that cause is part of the surface of an inkstand." It seems to me quite obvious that _this_ view, at all events, is utterly untenable. I do not believe for a moment, nor does any one, and certainly therefore do not judge, that this presented object has _only_ one cause: I believe that it has a whole series of different causes. I do, in fact, believe that this part of the surface of this inkstand is _one_ among the causes of my perception of this presented object: that seems to me to be a very well established scientific proposition. And I am prepared to admit that there _may_ be good reasons for thinking that it is one among the causes of this presented object itself, though I cannot myself see that there are any. But that it is the _only_ cause of this presented object I certainly do not believe, nor, I think, does anybody, and hence my judgment certainly cannot be "_The_ cause of this is part of the surface of an inkstand." It might no doubt, be possible to define some _kind_ of causal relation, such that it might be plausibly held that it and it alone causes this presented object _in that particular way._ But any such definition would, so far as I can see, be necessarily very complicated. And, even when we have got it, it seems to me it would be highly improbable we could truly say that what we are judging in these cases is: "This presented object has one and only one cause, of this special kind." Still, I do not wish to deny that some such view may _possibly_ be true. The only other suggestion I can make is that there may be some ultimate, not further definable relation, which we might for instance, call the relation of "being a manifestation of," such that we might conceivably be judging: "There is one and only one thing of which this presented object is a manifestation, and _that_ thing is part of the surface of an inkstand." And here again, it seems to me just possible that this _may_ be a true account of what we are judging; only I cannot find the slightest sign that I am in fact aware of any such relation.