B, would, under another set, be worse. Here, then, we have a case where an interpretation of "goodness," which does make it "objective," is incompatible with its being "intrinsic." And it is just this same fact--the fact that, on any "subjective" interpretation, the very same kind of thing which, under some circumstances, is better than another, would, under others, be worse--which constitutes, so far as I can see, the fundamental objection to all "subjective" interpretations. Obviously, therefore, to express this objection by saying that goodness is "objective" is very incorrect; since goodness might quite well be "objective" and yet _not_ possess the very characteristic which it is mainly wished to assert that it has. In the case, therefore, of ethical and aesthetic "goodness," I think that what those who contend for the "objectivity" of these conceptions really wish to contend for is not mere "objectivity" at all, but principally and essentially that they are _intrinsic_ kinds of value. But in the case of "right" and "wrong" and "duty," the same cannot be said, because many of those who object to the view that these conceptions are "subjective," nevertheless do not hold that they are "intrinsic." We cannot, therefore, say that what those who contend for the "objectivity" of right and wrong really mean is always chiefly that those conceptions are intrinsic, but we can, I think, say that what they do mean is certainly _not_ "objectivity" in this case any more than the other; since here, just as there, it would be possible to find certain views, which are in every sense "objective," to which they would object just as strongly as to any subjective view. And though what is meant by "objectivity" in this case, is not that "right" and "wrong" are _themselves_ "intrinsic," what is, I think, meant here too is that they have a fixed relation to a kind of value which _is_ "intrinsic." It is this fixed relation to an intrinsic kind of value, so far as I can see, which gives to right and wrong that kind and degree of fixity and impartiality which they actually are felt to possess, and which is what people are thinking of when they talk of their "objectivity." Here, too, therefore, to talk of the characteristic meant as "objectivity" is just as great a misnomer as in the other cases; since though it is a characteristic which is incompatible with any kind of "subjectivity," it is also incompatible, for the same reason, with many kinds of "objectivity."