I think this second proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying that the kind of value in question depends solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it. For we should naturally say of two things which were _exactly alike_ intrinsically, in spite of their being _two,_ that they possessed the _same_ intrinsic nature. But it is important to call attention expressly to the fact that what I mean by the expression 'having a different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to 'not exactly alike' because here there is real risk of confusion between this conception and a different one. This comes about as follows. It is natural to suppose that the phrase 'having a different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to the phrase 'intrinsically different' or 'having different intrinsic properties.' But, if we do make this identification, there is a risk of confusion. For it is obvious that there is a sense in which, when things are exactly like, they must be 'intrinsically different' and have different intrinsic properties, merely because they are two. For instance, two patches of colour may be exactly alike, in spite of the fact that each possesses a constituent which the other does not possess, provided only that their two constituents are exactly alike. And yet, in a certain sense, it is obvious that the fact that each has a constituent, which the other has not got, does constitute an intrinsic difference between them, and implies that each has an intrinsic property which the other has not got. And even where the two things are simple the mere fact that they are _numerically_ different does in a sense constitute an intrinsic difference between them, and each will have at least one intrinsic property which the other has not got--namely that of being identical with itself. It is obvious therefore that the phrases 'intrinsically different' and 'having different intrinsic properties' are ambiguous. They may be used in such a sense that to say of two things that they are intrinsically different or have different intrinsic properties does _not_ imply that they are not exactly alike, but only that they are _numerically_ different. Or they may be used in a sense in which two things can be said to be intrinsically different, and to have different intrinsic properties _only_ when they are not exactly alike. It is, therefore, extremely important to insist that when I say: Two things can differ in intrinsic value, only when they have different intrinsic natures, I am using the expression 'having different intrinsic natures' in the latter sense and not the former:--in a sense in which the mere fact that two things are two, or differ numerically, does _not_ imply that they have different intrinsic natures, but in which they can be said to have different intrinsic natures, _only_ where, besides differing numerically, they are also _not_ exactly alike.