That there is such a sense of necessity--a sense which entitles us to say that what has F _would have_ G, even if causal laws were quite different from what they are--is, I think, quite clear from such instances as the following. Suppose you take a particular patch of colour, which is yellow. We can, I think, say with certainty that any patch exactly like that one, _would_ be yellow, even if it existed in a Universe in which causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one. We can say that any such patch _must_ be yellow, quite unconditionally, whatever the circumstances, and whatever the causal laws. And it is in a sense similar to this, in respect of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal, that I mean the 'must' to be understood, when I say that if a kind of value is to be 'intrinsic,' then, supposing a given-thing possesses it in a certain degree, anything exactly like that thing _must_ possess it in exactly the same degree. To say, of 'beauty' or 'goodness' that they are 'intrinsic' is only, therefore, to say that this thing which is obviously true of 'yellowness' and 'blueness' and 'redness' is true of them. And if we give this sense to 'must' in our definition, then I think it is obvious that to say of a given kind of value that it is intrinsic _is_ inconsistent with its being 'subjective.' For there is, I think, pretty clearly no subjective predicate of which we can say thus unconditionally, that, _if_ a given thing possesses it, then anything exactly like that thing, _would,_ under any circumstances, and under any causal laws, also possess it. For instance, whatever kind of feeling you take, it is plainly not true that supposing I have that feeling towards a given thing A, then _I_ should necessarily under any circumstances have that feeling towards anything precisely similar to A: for the simple reason that a thing precisely similar to A _might_ exist in a Universe in which I did not exist at all. And similarly it is not true of any feeling whatever, that if _somebody_ has that feeling towards a given thing A, then, in arty Universe, in which a thing precisely similar to A existed, _somebody_ would have that feeling towards it. Nor finally is it even true, that if it is true of a given thing A, that, under actual causal laws, any one to whom A were presented in a certain way _would_ have a certain feeling towards it, then the same hypothetical predicate would, in any Universe, belong to anything precisely similar to A: in every case it seems to be possible that there _might_ be a Universe, in which the causal laws were such that the proposition would not be true.