different types of naturalistic theory, the difference between which may be illustrated by the difference between the assertion, "A is good" _means_ "A is pleasant" and the assertion "A is good" _means_ "A is a state of pleasure." Theories of the former type imply that goodness is _not_ an intrinsic kind of value, whereas theories of the latter type imply equally emphatically that it is: since obviously such predicates as that "of being a state of pleasure," or "containing a balance of pleasure," _are_ predicates like "yellow" in respect of the fact that if a given thing possesses them, anything exactly like the thing in question must possess them. It seems to me equally obvious that _both_ types of theory are false: but I do not know how to exclude them both except by saying that two different propositions are both true of _goodness_, namely: (1) that it does depend _only_ on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it--which excludes theories of the first type and (2) that, _though_ this is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic property--which excludes those of the second. It was for this reason that I said above that, if there are any intrinsic kinds of value, they would constitute a class of predicates which is, perhaps, unique; for I cannot think of any other predicate which resembles them in respect of the fact, that though _not_ itself intrinsic, it yet shares with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it. So far as I know, certain predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them.