In one sense, then, it is plainly not true that all our true ideas
are useful. But there still remains a perfectly legitimate sense in
which it might be true. It might be meant, that is, not that every
_occurrence_ of a true idea is useful, but that every true idea is
useful on at least one of the occasions when it occurs. But is this,
in fact, the case? It seems to me almost as plain that it is not, as
that the other was not. We have seen that true ideas are not by any
means always useful on every occasion when they occur; though most
that do occur many times over and to many different people are, no
doubt, useful on some of these occasions. But there seems to be an
immense number of true ideas, which occur but once and to one person,
and never again either to him or to anyone else. I may, for instance,
idly count the number of dots on the back of a card, and arrive at a
true idea of their number; and yet, perhaps, I may never think of their
number again, nor anybody else ever know it. We are all, it seems to
me, constantly noticing trivial details, and getting true ideas about
them, of which we never think again, and which nobody else ever gets.
And is it quite certain that all these true ideas are useful? It seems
to me perfectly clear, on the contrary, that many of them are not. Just
as it is clear that many men sometimes waste their time in acquiring
information which is useful to others but not to them, surely it is
clear that they sometimes waste their time in acquiring information,
which is useful to nobody at all, because nobody else ever acquires
it. I do not say that it is never useful idly to count the number
of dots on the back of a card. Plainly it is sometimes useful to be
idle, and one idle employment may often be as good as another. But
surely it is true that men _sometimes_ do these things when their time
would have been better employed otherwise? Surely they sometimes get
into the habit of attending to trivial truths, which it is as great a
disadvantage that they should attend to as that they should constantly
be thinking of their own thoughts and blemishes? I cannot see my way
to deny that this is so; and therefore I cannot see my way to assert
positively that all our true ideas are useful, even so much as on _one
occasion._ It seems to me that there are many true ideas which occur
but once, and which are not useful when they do occur. And if this be
so, then it is plainly not true that _all_ our true ideas are useful in
any sense at all.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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