Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
The third phenomenon I have remarked will be a full confirmation of
this. 'Tis not every removal in time which has the effect of producing
veneration and esteem. We are not apt to imagine our posterity
will excel us, or equal our ancestors. This phenomenon is the more
remarkable, because any distance in futurity weakens not our ideas so
much as an equal removal in the past. Though a removal in the past,
when very great, increases our passions beyond a like removal in the
future, yet a small removal has a greater influence in diminishing them.
In our common way of thinking we are placed in a kind of middle station
betwixt the past and future; and as our imagination finds a kind of
difficulty in running along the former, and a facility in following
the course of the latter, the difficulty conveys the notion of ascent,
and the facility of the contrary. Hence we imagine our ancestors to
be, in a manner, mounted above us, and our posterity to lie below us.
Our fancy arrives not at the one without effort, but easily reaches
the other: which effort weakens the conception, where the distance is
small; but enlarges and elevates the imagination, when attended with a
suitable object. As on the other hand, the facility assists the fancy
in a small removal, but takes off from its force when it contemplates
any considerable distance.
It may not be improper, before we leave this subject of the will, to
resume, in a few words, all that has been said concerning it, in order
to set the whole more distinctly before the eyes of the reader. What we
commonly understand by _passion_ is a violent and sensible emotion of
mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the
original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite.
By _reason_ we mean affections of the very same kind with the former,
but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper:
which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes
us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties.
Both the _causes_ and _effects_ of these violent and calm passions are
pretty variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper
and disposition of every individual. Generally speaking, the violent
passions have a more powerful influence on the will; though 'tis
often found that the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and
seconded by resolution, are able to control them in their most furious
movements. What makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm
passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change
of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object; as by
the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by
exciting the imagination. Upon the whole, this struggle of passion
and of reason, as it is called, diversifies human life, and makes men
so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in
different times.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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