Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
In vain should we expect to find, in _uncultivated nature_, a remedy to
this inconvenience; or hope for any inartificial principle of the human
mind which might control those partial affections, and make us overcome
the temptations arising from our circumstances. The idea of justice
can never serve to this purpose, or be taken for a natural principle,
capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other.
That virtue, as it is now understood, would never have been dreamed
of among rude and savage men. For the notion of injury or injustice
implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person: And
as every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the
passions, and as this defect must be judged of, in a great measure,
from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind,
'twill be easy to know whether we be guilty of any immorality with
regard to others, by considering the natural and usual force of those
several affections which are directed towards them. Now, it appears
that, in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention
is confined to ourselves; our next is extended to our relations and
acquaintance; and 'tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and
indifferent persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection, must
not only have an influence on our behaviour and conduct in society,
but even on our ideas of vice and virtue; so as to make us regard any
remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality, either by
too great an enlargement or contraction of the affections, as vicious
and immoral. This we may observe in our common judgments concerning
actions, where we blame a person who either centres all his affections
in his family, or is so regardless of them as, in any opposition
of interest, to give the preference to a stranger or mere chance
acquaintance. From all which it follows, that our natural uncultivated
ideas of morality, instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of
our affections, do rather conform themselves to that partiality, and
give it an additional force and influence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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