Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
'Tis certain, that no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient
force and a proper direction to counterbalance the love of gain,
and render men fit members of society, by making them abstain from
the possessions of others. Benevolence to strangers is too weak for
this purpose; and as to the other passions, they rather inflame this
avidity, when we observe, that the larger our possessions are, the more
ability we have of gratifying all our appetites. There is no passion,
therefore, capable of controlling the interested affection, but the
very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now, this
alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection;
since 'tis evident that the passion is much better satisfied by its
restraint than by its liberty, and that, in preserving society, we
make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than in the
solitary and forlorn condition which must follow upon violence and an
universal license. The question, therefore, concerning the wickedness
or goodness of human nature, enters not in the least into that other
question concerning the origin of society; nor is there any thing to
be considered but the degrees of men's sagacity or folly. For whether
the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, 'tis all
a case, since itself alone restrains it; so that if it be virtuous,
men become social by their virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same
effect.
Now, as 'tis by establishing the rule for the stability of possession
that this passion restrains itself, if that rule be very abstruse
and of difficult invention, society must be esteemed in a manner
accidental, and the effect of many ages. But if it be found, that
nothing can be more simple and obvious than that rule; that every
parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must establish
it; and that these first rudiments of justice must every day be
improved, as the society enlarges: if all this appear evident, as it
certainly must, we may conclude that 'tis utterly impossible for men to
remain any considerable time in that savage condition which precedes
society, but that his very first state and situation may justly be
esteemed social. This, however, hinders not but that philosophers
may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the supposed _state of
nature_; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction,
which never had, and never could have, any reality. Human nature
being composed of two principal parts, which are requisite in all
its actions, the affections and understanding, 'tis certain that the
blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter,
incapacitate men for society; and it may be allowed us to consider
separately the effects that result from the separate operations
of these two component parts of the mind. The same liberty may be
permitted to moral, which is allowed to natural philosophers; and 'tis
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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