Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
So far is determined by a plain utility and interest. But perhaps 'tis
from more trivial reasons, that _delivery_, or a sensible transference
of the object, is commonly required by civil laws, and also by the laws
of nature, according to most authors, as a requisite circumstance in
the translation of property. The property of an object, when taken for
something real, without any reference to morality, or the sentiments of
the mind, is a quality perfectly insensible, and even inconceivable;
nor can we form any distinct notion, either of its stability or
translation. This imperfection of our ideas is less sensibly felt with
regard to its stability, as it engages less our attention, and is
easily past over by the mind, without any scrupulous examination. But
as the translation of property from one person to another is a more
remarkable event, the defect of our ideas becomes more sensible on that
occasion, and obliges us to turn ourselves on every side in search of
some remedy. Now, as nothing more enlivens any idea than a present
impression, and a relation betwixt that impression and the idea; 'tis
natural for us to seek some false light from this quarter. In order
to aid the imagination in conceiving the transference of property, we
take the sensible object, and actually transfer its possession to the
person on whom we would bestow the property. The supposed resemblance
of the actions, and the presence of this sensible delivery, deceive the
mind, and make it fancy that it conceives the mysterious transition of
the property. And that this explication of the matter is just, appears
hence, that men have invented a _symbolical_ delivery, to satisfy the
fancy where the real one is impracticable. Thus the giving the keys of
a granary, is understood to be the delivery of the corn contained in
it: the giving of stone and earth represents the delivery of a manor.
This is a kind of superstitious practice in civil laws, and in the laws
of nature, resembling the _Roman Catholic_ superstitions in religion.
As the _Roman Catholics_ represent the inconceivable mysteries of the
_Christian_ religion, and render them more present to the mind, by
a taper, or habit, or grimace, which is supposed to resemble them;
so lawyers and moralists have run into like inventions for the same
reason, and have endeavoured by those means to satisfy themselves
concerning the transference of property by consent.
SECTION V.
OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES.
That the rule of morality, which enjoins the performance of
promises, is not _natural_, will sufficiently appear from these two
propositions, which I proceed to prove, viz. _that a promise would not
be intelligible before human conventions had established it; and that
even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral
obligation_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account