Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
_First_, If nature had given us a pleasure of this kind, it would
have been as evident and discernible as on every other occasion; nor
should we have found any difficulty to perceive, that the consideration
of such actions, in such a situation, gives a certain pleasure and
sentiment of approbation. We should not have been obliged to have
recourse to notions of property in the definition of justice, and at
the same time make use of the notions of justice in the definition of
pro-property. This deceitful method of reasoning is a plain proof that
there are contained in the subject some obscurities and difficulties
which we are not able to surmount, and which we desire to evade by this
artifice.
_Secondly_, Those rules by which properties, rights and obligations
are determined, have in them no marks of a natural origin, but many
of artifice and contrivance. They are too numerous to have proceeded
from nature; they are changeable by human laws; and have all of them a
direct and evident tendency to public good, and the support of civil
society. This last circumstance is remarkable upon two accounts.
_First_, Because, though the cause of the establishment of these laws
had been a _regard_ for the public good, as much as the public good
is their natural tendency, they would still have been artificial, as
being purposely contrived, and directed to a certain end. _Secondly_,
Because, if men had been endowed with such a strong regard for public
good, they would never have restrained themselves by these rules; so
that the laws of justice arise from natural principles, in a manner
still more oblique and artificial. 'Tis self-love which is their real
origin; and as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to
that of another, these several interested passions are obliged to
adjust themselves after such a manner as to concur in some system
of conduct and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the
interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to the public,
though it be not intended for that purpose by the inventors.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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