Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
_Seventh experiment_. To put this whole reasoning to a farther trial,
let us make a new experiment; and as we have already seen the effects
of related passions and ideas, let us here suppose an identity of
passions along with a relation of ideas; and let us consider the
effects of this new situation. 'Tis evident a transition of the
passions from the one object to the other is here in all reason to be
expected; since the relation of ideas is supposed still to continue,
and an identity of impressions must produce a stronger connexion,
than the most perfect resemblance that can be imagined. If a double
relation, therefore, of impressions and ideas, is able to produce a
transition from one to the other, much more an identity of impressions
with a relation of ideas. Accordingly, we find, that when we either
love or hate any person, the passions seldom continue within their
first bounds; but extend themselves towards all the contiguous
objects, and comprehend the friends and relations of him we love or
hate. Nothing is more natural than to bear a kindness to one brother on
account of our friendship for another, without any farther examination
of his character. A quarrel with one person gives us a hatred for the
whole family, though entirely innocent of that which displeases us.
Instances of this kind are every where to be met with.
There is only one difficulty in this experiment which it will be
necessary to account for, before we proceed any farther. 'Tis evident,
that though all passions pass easily from one object to another related
to it, yet this transition is made with greater facility where the
more considerable object is first presented, and the lesser follows
it, than where this order is reversed, and the lesser takes the
precedence. Thus, 'tis more natural for us to love the son upon account
of the father, than the father upon account of the son; the servant
for the master, than the master for the servant; the subject for the
prince, than the prince for the subject. In like manner we more readily
contract a hatred against a whole family, where our first quarrel
is with the head of it, than where we are displeased with a son, or
servant, or some inferior member. In short, our passions, like other
objects, descend with greater facility than they ascend.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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