Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the AuthorHume, David
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4): Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author
Hume, David
Knowledge, Theory of; Philosophy, English -- 18th century
This reasoning will account for the origin of envy as well as of
malice. The only difference betwixt these passions lies in this,
that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which, by
comparison, diminishes our idea of our own: whereas malice is the
unprovoked desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a
pleasure from the comparison. The enjoyment, which is the object of
envy, is commonly superior to our own. A superiority naturally seems to
overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison. But even in the
case of an inferiority, we still desire a greater distance, in order to
augment still more the idea of ourself. When this distance diminishes,
the comparison is, less to our advantage, and consequently gives us
less pleasure, and is even disagreeable. Hence arises that species of
envy which men feel, when they perceive their inferiors approaching or
overtaking them in the pursuit of glory or happiness. In this envy we
may see the effects of comparison twice repeated. A man, who compares
himself to his inferior, receives a pleasure from the comparison; and
when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what
should only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain, by a
new comparison with its preceding condition.
'Tis worthy of observation concerning that envy which arises from a
superiority in others, that 'tis not the great disproportion betwixt
ourself and another, which produces it; but, on the contrary, our
proximity. A common soldier bears no such envy to his general as
to his sergeant or corporal; nor does an eminent writer meet with
so great jealousy in common hackney scribblers, as in authors that
more nearly approach him. It may indeed be thought, that the greater
the disproportion is, the greater must be the uneasiness from the
comparison. But we may consider on the other hand, that the great
disproportion cuts off the relation, and either keeps us from comparing
ourselves, with what is remote from us, or diminishes the effects of
the comparison. Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of
ideas; and where you destroy these ties, however other accidents may
bring two ideas together, as they have no bond or connecting quality
to join them in the imagination, 'tis impossible they can remain long
united, or have any considerable influence on each other.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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