connected with the body which is speaking in the way (to be further
investigated) in which thoughts and bodies are connected. All this is
rather complicated, and cannot be admitted as part of any ultimate
certainty. What Descartes really felt sure about was a certain
occurrence, which he described in the words “I think”. But the words
were not quite an accurate representation of the occurrence; indeed,
words never can escape from certain grammatical and social requirements
which make them say at once more and less than we really mean. I think
we ought to admit that Descartes was justified in feeling sure that
there was a certain occurrence, concerning which doubt was impossible;
but he was not justified in bringing in the word “I” in describing this
occurrence, and it remains to be considered whether he was justified in
using the word “think”.
In using a general word such as “think”, we are obviously going beyond
the datum, from a logical point of view. We are subsuming a particular
occurrence under a heading, and the heading is derived from past
experience. Now all words are applicable to many occurrences; therefore
all words go beyond any possible datum. In this sense, it is impossible
ever to convey in words the particularity of a concrete experience; all
words are more or less abstract. Such, at least, is a plausible line
of argument, but I am by no means sure that it is valid. For example,
the sight of a particular dog may make the general word “dog” come
into your mind; you then know that it is a dog, but you may not notice
what sort of dog it is. In this sense, the knowledge with which we
start is abstract and general; that is to say, it consists of a learned
reaction to a stimulus of a certain sort. The reactions, at any rate
in so far as they are verbal, are more uniform than the stimuli. A
witness might be asked “Did you see a dog?” “Yes.” “What sort of dog?”
“Oh, just an ordinary dog; I don’t remember more about it.” That is to
say, the witness’s reaction consisted of the generalised word “dog”
and no more. One is almost reminded of quantum phenomena in the atom.
When light falls on a hydrogen atom, it may make the electron jump from
the first orbit to the second, or to the third, etc. Each of these
is a generalised reaction to a stimulus which has no corresponding
generality. So dogs and cats have each their individual peculiarities,
but the ordinary inobservant person responds with the generalised
reaction “dog” or “cat”, and the particularity of the stimulus leads to
no corresponding particularity in the knowledge-reaction.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account