more obvious when it comes to reading the names of the politicians,
considering whether they are good likenesses, and feeling what a fine
fellow one of them looks and what unmitigated villainy is stamped upon
the features of the other. None of this counts as sensation, yet it is
part of a man’s spontaneous reaction to an outside stimulus.
It is evidently difficult to avoid a certain artificiality in
distinguishing between the effects of experience and the rest in a
man’s reaction to a stimulus. Perhaps we could tackle the matter in a
slightly different way. We can distinguish stimuli of different sorts:
to the eye, the ear, the nose, the palate, etc. We can also distinguish
elements of different sorts in the reaction: visual elements, auditory
elements, etc. The latter are defined, not by the stimulus, but by
their intrinsic quality. A visual sensation and a visual image have
a common quality which neither shares with an auditory sensation or
an auditory image. We may then say: a visual image is an occurrence
having the visual quality but not due to a stimulus to the eye, _i.e._
not having as a direct causal antecedent the incidence of light-waves
upon the retina. Similarly an auditory image will be an occurrence
having the auditory quality but not due to sound-waves reaching the
ear, and so on for the other senses. This means a complete abandonment
of the attempt to distinguish psychologically between sensations and
images; the distinction becomes solely one as to physical antecedents.
It is true that we can and do arrive at the distinction without
scientific physics, because we find that certain elements in our
integral reactions have the correlations that make us regard them as
corresponding to something external while others do not--correlations
both with the experience of others and with our own past and future
experiences. But when we refine upon this common-sense distinction and
try to make it precise, it becomes the distinction in terms of physics
as stated just now.
We might therefore conclude that an image is an occurrence having the
quality associated with stimulation by some sense-organ, but not due
to such stimulation. In human beings, images seem to depend upon past
experience, but perhaps in more instinctive animals they are partly due
to innate cerebral mechanisms. In any case dependence upon experience
is not the mark by which they are to be defined. This shows how
intimate is the dependence of traditional psychology upon physics, and
how difficult it is to make psychology into an autonomous science.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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