“Sensation”, as opposed to perception, is more or less hypothetical.
It is supposed to be the core, in the perception, which is solely due
to the stimulus and the sense-organ, not to past experience. When
you judge that the table is rectangular, it is past experience that
enables and compels you to do so; if you had been born blind and just
operated upon, you could not make this judgment. Nor would you have
expectations of hardness, etc. But none of this can be discovered by
introspection. From an introspective point of view, the elements due
to past experience are largely indistinguishable from those due to the
stimulus alone. One supposes that past experience modifies the brain,
and thereby modifies the mental occurrence due to the stimulus. The
notion of sensation as opposed to perception belongs, therefore, to the
causal study of perception, not to the introspective study.
There is, however, a distinction to be made here. You can discover
by mere self-observation that visual objects are accompanied by
expectations or images of touch; and similarly if you touch an object
in the dark you will probably be led to form some visual image of
it. Here you can arrive at a certain degree of analysis of your
perception through the fact that images, as a rule, _feel_ different
from the immediate results of a sensory stimulus. On the other hand,
no amount of introspection alone will reveal such things as the blind
spot. The filling in of a sensation by elements belonging to the same
sense is much less discoverable by introspection than the filling
in by associated images belonging to other senses. Thus although
by introspection alone we could discover _part_ of the influence
of experience on perception, there is another part which we cannot
discover in this way.
Remaining in the introspective attitude, it is evident that the
contents of our minds at any given moment are very complex. Throughout
our normal waking life we are always seeing, hearing, and touching,
sometimes smelling and tasting, always having various bodily
sensations, always feeling pleasant or unpleasant feelings (usually
both), always having desires or aversions. We are not normally aware
of all these items, but we can become aware of any of them by turning
our attention in the right direction. I am not at present discussing
“unconscious mental states”, because they, obviously, can only be known
causally, and we are now considering what can be known introspectively.
There may be any number of perceptions that cannot be known by
introspection; the point for us, at the moment, is that those that can
be discovered by introspection at any one time are many and various.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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