_Is matter emergent from events?_ In the present state of science it is difficult to give a decided answer to this question. The notion of matter, in modern physics, has become absorbed into the notion of energy. Eddington, in his _Mathematical Theory of Relativity_ shows that, in virtue of the laws assumed concerning events, there must be something having the observed properties of matter and energy as regards conservation. This he calls the “material-energy-tensor”, and suggests that it is the reality which we sometimes call “matter” and sometimes “energy”. To this extent, matter has been shown to be not emergent. But the existence of electrons and protons (to the extent that they do exist) has not yet been deduced from the general theory of relativity, though attempts are being made and may at any moment succeed. If and when these attempts succeed, physics will cease to be in any degree independent of chrono-geography, but for the present it remains in part independent. As for chemistry, although we cannot practically reduce it all to physics, we can see how, theoretically, this could be done, and I think it is safe to assume that it is not an ultimately independent science. The question we have been asking is: could we predict, theoretically, from the laws of events that there must be material units obeying the laws which they do in fact obey, or is this a new, logically independent, fact? In theory we might be able to prove that it is _not_ independent, but it would be very difficult to prove that it _is_. The present position is, broadly speaking, that the continuous properties of the physical world can be deduced from chrono-geography, but not the discontinuous facts, viz. electrons and protons and Planck’s quantum. Thus for the present materiality is practically, though perhaps not theoretically, an emergent characteristic of certain groups of events. _Is mind emergent from events?_ This question, as yet, can hardly be even discussed intelligently, because psychology is not a sufficiently advanced science. There are, nevertheless, some points to be noted. Chrono-geography is concerned only with the abstract mathematical properties of events, and cannot conceivably, unless it is radically transformed, prove that there are visual events, or auditory events, or events of any of the kinds that we know by perception. In this sense, psychology is certainly emergent from chrono-geography and also from physics, and it is hard to see how it can ever cease to be so. The reason for this is that our knowledge of data contains features of a qualitative sort, which cannot be deduced from the merely mathematical features of the space-time events inferred from data, and yet these abstract mathematical features are all that we can legitimately infer. The above argument decides also that mind must be emergent from matter, if it is a material structure. No amount of physics can ever tell us all that we do in fact know about our own percepts.