Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at CambridgeRashdall, Hastings
Religion
Philosophy and Religion: Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge
Rashdall, Hastings
Christianity; Philosophy and religion
(4) If it be suggested (as Dr. McTaggart was at one time inclined to
suggest) that every mind considered as a timeless Noumenon is omniscient,
though in its phenomenal and temporal aspect its knowledge is
intermittent and always limited, I reply (_a_) the theory seems to me not
only gratuitous but unintelligible, and (_b_) it is open to all the
difficulties and objections of the theory that time and change are merely
subjective delusions. This is too large a question to discuss here: I
can only refer to the treatment of the subject by such writers as Lotze
(see above) and M. Bergson. I may also refer to Mr. Bradley's argument
(_Appearance and Reality_, p. 50 sq.) against the theory that the
individual Ego is out of time.
(5) The theory of pre-existent souls is opposed to all the probabilities
suggested by experience. Soul and organism are connected in such a way
that the pre-existence of one element in what presents itself and works
in our world as a unity is an extremely difficult supposition, and
involves assumptions which reduce to a minimum the amount of identity or
continuity that could be claimed for the Ego throughout its successive
lives. A soul which has forgotten all its previous experiences may have
some identity with its previous state, but not much. Moreover, we should
have to suppose that the correspondence of a certain type of body with a
certain kind of soul, as well as the resemblance between the individual
and his parents, implies no kind of causal connexion, but is due to mere
accident; or, if it is not to accident, to a very arbitrary kind of
pre-established harmony which there is nothing in experience to suggest,
and which (upon Dr. McTaggart's theory) there is no creative intelligence
to pre-establish. The theory cannot be absolutely refuted, but all Dr.
McTaggart's ingenuity has not--to my own mind, {125} and (I feel sure) to
most minds--made it seem otherwise than extremely difficult and
improbable. Its sole recommendation is that it makes possible an
Idealism without Theism: but, if Theism be an easier and more defensible
theory, that is no recommendation at all.
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